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DO WE NEED TO SECURE A PLACE AT THE TABLE FOR WOMEN?  AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGALITY OF CALIFORNIA LAW SB-826 
 
Teal N. Trujillo† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 1, 2018, close to 20,000 Google employees marched out of offices 
in fifty different cities as part of a global protest against gender inequality in the 
workplace.1  This event was ignited by the recent disclosure that Google had paid a 
$90 million exit package to Andy Rubin, creator of the Android operating system, 
following a merited sexual harassment claim.2  But tensions have been rising in 
Silicon Valley for years.3  From San Francisco to Google’s headquarters in Mountain 
View, California, protestors bellowed, “This doesn’t end today” and “Time is up in 
Tech. Time is up at Google.”4  Protestors invoked the “Time’s Up” language of the 
#MeToo Movement, which unearthed numerous prolonged scandals of sexual 
misconduct in nearly every industry over the past year.  The movement sent 
shockwaves throughout the country.5  Protestors in California were making a 
statement to the entire tech community, where women face exclusion on the outskirts 
of boy’s club dynamics6 and are notably underrepresented.7  
                                                          
† J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; B.A., Saint Louis University, 2016.  I would like to 
thank the members of the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their diligent editing and support in writing 
this Note.  Most importantly, I would like to thank all the strong women in my life, especially my mother, my 
Nana Phyllis Kime, and my Grandma Nico Trujillo. 
1  See Jillian D’Onfro, Google Walkouts Showed What the New Tech Resistance Looks Like, with Lots of 
Cues from Union Organizing, CNBC (Nov. 3, 2018, 1:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/03/google-em-
ployee-protests-as-part-of-new-tech-resistance.html. 
2  See Kate Conger & Inyoung Kang, California Today: Google Employees Around the World Walk Out, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018, 4:41 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/us/california-today-google-pro-
test.html. 
3  See generally Google Reveals 48 Employees Fired for Sexual Harassment, AP NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/06bbde4e7ba449089a62d8d351ecbe8c (attempting to combat rumors of large exit 
severance packages given to male executives accused of sexual harassment, Google reveals forty-eight men 
were fired over the past two years with nothing, no compensation packages). 
4  D’Onfro, supra note 1.  
5  See generally Stephanie Zacharek et al., Time Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME 
(Nov. 4, 2018, 5:23 PM), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/. 
6  Kim Parker, Women in Majority-Male Workplaces Report Higher Rates of Gender Discrimination, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 6, 2018 4:30 PM), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/07/women-in-major-
ity-male-workplaces-report-higher-rates-of-gender-discrimination/ (explaining 49% of women in male-domi-
nated industries said sexual harassment was a problem in their workplaces, compared to 32% of women whose 
workplaces had more women than men). 
7  Brooke E. Dresden et al., Male-Dominated No Girls Allowed: Women in Male-Dominated Majors Ex-
perience Increased Gender Harassment and Bias, 121 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 459, 460 (2018) (“14% of 
women who graduate with an engineering degree never enter the workforce, and a significant portion cite the 
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Google, a company that is only 31% female, was confronted with a call for 
“transparency, accountability and structural change” as written by the protest 
organizers on an internal Google site.8  The demands went beyond better handling of 
sexual harassment claims and were a petition for basic fairness among sexes in the 
workplace.9  The demands alluded to the unequal treatment of women at Google, a 
side effect of the male-dominated environment.  In 2017, Pew Research Center found 
that 37% of women working in a majority-male workplace felt they had been treated 
as if they were not competent because of their gender at some point.10  They were 
also much more likely to have experienced small slights in the workplace as opposed 
to majority-female or mixed group workplaces.  
The lack of female representation in executive positions compounds the problem.  
Equal treatment in the workplace starts from the top down.  Looking at the big 
picture, it may seem that women are succeeding on this front, as the number of 
women holding chief executive positions nearly doubled from 2007 to 2017.11  
However, that was an increase from just 2.8% to 5.4%.12  By 2017, only twenty-seven 
companies in the benchmark S&P 500 stock index had female CEOs.13  Currently, 
women hold a very small number of top executive positions in U.S. corporations.   
One solution suggested to this problem is to mandate the presence of women on 
corporate boards.  California has become the first state to enact a quota for the number 
of women that must serve on qualifying corporation’s board of directors.14  On 
September 30, 2018, Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 826 (“SB-826”) into 
law, requiring all publicly traded companies with principal executive offices in 
California to have at least one woman on their board of directors by 2019.15  In the 
three years following, depending on the size of the board, companies would also need 
to hire another one to two females directors.16  The goal being that boards would end 
up with a makeup that is at least 40% female.  Corporate boards that do not comply 
face financial penalty.17  
Though the bill passed with high percentages in both the Assembly and Senate, 
                                                          
‘engineering culture’ as their main reason for leaving” and “[o]ne factor that may influence the perceived neg-
ative ‘engineering culture’ is sexual harassment”). 
8  Conger & Kang, supra note 2.  
9  Id.  The protestors had five specific demands allegedly including, “an end to forced arbitration of sexual 
harassment and assault, increased transparency about compensation and the appointment of an employee rep-
resentative to the company’s board.”  Id.  
10  Parker, supra note 6.  
11  Drew Desilver, Few Women Lead Large U.S. Companies, Despite Modest Gains Over Past Decade, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/26/few-women-lead-
large-u-s-companies-despite-modest-gains-over-past-decade/ (“In 2017, 27 companies in the S&P 500 (or 
5.4%) had women CEOs, up from 14 (2.8%) in 2007.”).  
12  Id.  
13  Id. 
14  See Vanessa Furhmans, California Becomes First State to Mandate Female Board Directors, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2018 6:13 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-moves-to-mandate-female-board-
directors-1535571904?mod=article_inline. 
15  S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013). 
16  Furhmans, supra note 14.  
17  Id. 
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it has fostered strong opposition.  Multiple business groups including the California 
Chamber of Commerce opposed the mandate as violating the United States and 
California constitutions, as it could result in adverse treatment based on merely one 
element of diversity: gender.18  Additionally, there are constitutional challenges 
regarding enforcement as few companies have both their principal offices and are 
doing a majority of their business in California.19  Regardless of the complexities 
surrounding the enforcement of SB-826, the disparity of women in executive 
positions is a significant issue.  
This Note will delve into the particulars of California SB-826 to determine its 
legality and to examine available alternatives to accomplish its goal: to encourage 
equitable gender representation on corporate boards.  Part I of this Note will discuss 
the requirements of SB-826 and the purpose behind the law including the legislature’s 
intent.  Part II will provide an examination of possible legal challenges that could be 
brought against the law.  This Part will argue that SB-826 could not survive a 
constitutional challenge but should be salvaged due to the necessity of the bill.  
Finally, Part III will address alternative ways California could accomplish similar 
objectives proposed in SB-826 while still complying with both the state and national 
constitution.   
 
I.  UNDERSTANDING SENATE BILL 826 
 
SB-826 is not California’s first attempt at creating gender quotas, but the product 
of a continued commitment to the problem of underrepresentation of women in 
executive positions. On September 12, 2013, the California State Senate passed 
Concurrent Resolution Number 62 (“SCR-62”), a measure to “encourage equitable 
and diverse gender representation on corporate boards.”20  The Resolution was 
authored by Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson and sponsored by the National 
Association of Women Business Owners—California (NAWBO—CA).21  This 
measure was the brain-child of what would become SB-826, imposing extremely 
similar quotas.22  It relied upon multiple studies citing increased financial success and 
improved corporate culture among boards that include women.23  The difference was 
                                                          
18  Id.  The California Chamber of Commerce argues the mandate violated the U.S. and California con-
stitutions because it could put companies in the position of displacing men seeking to serve on boards.  Id.   
19  Id. 
20  S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013).  
21  See Jackson Bill to Make California the First State to Require Women on Corporate Boards Heads to 
the Governor, CAL. SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS (Aug. 30, 2018), https://sd19.senate.ca.gov/news/2018-08-30-
jackson-bill-make-california-first-state-require-women-corporate-boards-heads. 
22  S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013).  The relevant portion of SCR-62 text:  
(“[W]ithin a 3-year period from January 2014 to December 2016, inclusive, every publicly held corpora-
tion in California with 9 or more director seats have a minimum of 3 women on its board, every publicly held 
corporation in California with 5 to 8 director seats have a minimum of 2 women on its board, and every publicly 
held corporation in California with 5 to 8 director seats have a minimum of one woman on its board.”). 
23  S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013) (“A McKinsey and Company study entitled ‘Women 
Matter’ showed that companies where women are strongly represented at board or top management levels are 
also the companies that perform best.”  “An Oklahoma State University study found that board diversity, in-
cluding gender and ethnicity, is associated with improved financial value.”).  
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that the Resolution was non-binding and had no legally enforceable consequences for 
violations of its terms.  California became the first state in the country to make an 
effort to define board diversity by taking such a stance.24  The passing of SCR-62 set 
a precedent for other states who then passed initiatives with the same goals.25  The 
following subparts will now discuss how the California State Senate built upon the 
framework created by SCR-62 to pass the current legislation.  
 
A.Requirements of California Senate Bill 826 
 
Five years after the SCR-62 initiative, California passed a binding piece of 
legislation regarding gender representation on corporate boards.  Senate Bill 826, also 
authored by Senator Jackson, is an Act adding §§ 301.3 and 2115.5 to the California 
Corporation Code.  Section 301.3(a) states that by the close of the year 2019 any 
publicly held domestic or foreign corporation with principal executive offices in 
California shall have a female director on its board.26  The section goes on to make 
cumulative mandates through the year 2021:  
 
(b) No later than the close of the 2021 calendar year, a publicly held 
domestic or foreign corporation whose principal executive offices, 
according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in 
California shall comply with the following:  
 
(1) If its number of directors is six or more, the corporation 
shall have a minimum of three female directors.  
 
(2) If its number of directors is five, the corporation shall 
have a minimum of two female directors. 
 
(3) If its number of directors is four or fewer, the corporation 
shall have a minimum of one female director.27 
 
For purposes of this mandate, a publicly held corporation is defined as “a corporation 
with outstanding shares listed on a major United States stock exchange.”28  Among 
the Russell 3000 Index, a listing of such companies, 485 corporations—or 17% of 
the total companies—had all-male boards in the second quarter of 2017.29  Eighty-
six of these companies are headquartered in California, including brand names like 
                                                          
24 See Melissa Breuer, Note, Next Stop for Diversity Initiatives: Corporate Boardrooms, 42 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 223, 226 (2016).  
25  Id. (“On May 31, 2015, the Illinois House of Representatives passed HR 439, and on July 29, 2015, 
the Massachusetts Senate passed S1007.  Each of these resolutions seeks to accomplish the same set of goals 
that CA SCR-62 was established to achieve.”).  
26  2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 954 (SB-826) (current version at CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3).  
27  Id. 
28  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(f)(2) (West 2018). 
29  See Vanessa Fuhrmans & Alejandro Lazo, California Moves to Mandate Female Board Directors, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2018 10:06 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-moves-to-mandate-female-
board-directors-1535571904?mod=article_inline.  
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Sketches USA Inc. and TiVo Corp.30  Further, the plain language of the law reads 
that it shall be binding upon any corporation “whose principal executive offices, 
according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in California.”31  
Therefore, the law applies where: (1) the corporation’s outstanding shares are listed 
on a major United States stock exchange and (2) the principal executive offices in 
accordance with the UnitedStates Securities Exchange Commission Form 10-K are 
located in California.   
Turning back to the core requirements of the measure, additional consideration 
should be given to how the bill has chosen to define female and the restrictions—or 
lack thereof—placed on corporate board seats.  As to the former, female is defined 
as “an individual who self-identifies her gender as a woman, without regard to the 
individual’s designated sex at birth.”32  The bill does not require a quota of the female 
sex.  It is a mandate based on gender.  Consequently, the bill is inclusive of 
transsexuals or all other persons self-identifying as female.  This definition could be 
an intentional effort to circumvent the argument that the law is beneficial toward only 
one protected class of persons, people of the female sex.  And so, the bill is 
technically not a bar to persons of the male sex.  It is also a testament to the 
progressive ideals held by modern culture.  The second interesting facet of the law is 
that it does not cap the number of seats a corporate board could have.  For current 
boards that are predominately male, the law is not requiring that male board members 
be removed from their seats in order to be in compliance.33  There is no prohibition 
on the addition of extra board seats to comport with the mandate.  These two aspects 
of the law bolster the argument that the law is constitutional.  
 The final requirement, and most striking distinction between the bill and the 
previous resolution, SCR-62, is the inclusion of sanctions.  There are now financial 
penalties enforceable upon public corporations who do not comply with the mandate.  
According to Section 301.3(e)(1), a first violation is punished by a $100,000 fine, 
and a second violation by a $300,000 fine.34  There is another $100,000 fine for 
“failure to timely file board member information with the Secretary of State.”35  Part 
of complying with SB-826 requires disclosure to the State.  Section 301.3(d) reads 
by the year 2020 “and annually thereafter,” the bill necessitates a report be published 
online by the Secretary of State recording the number of corporations’ subject to this 
section that were in compliance, the number of new corporations that will need to be 
in compliance, and the number of corporations that will no longer have to comply.36  
                                                          
30  Id. 
31  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018). 
32  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(f)(1) (West 2018). 
33  See Teresa L. Johnson, Hurdles Ahead for California’s Female Director Mandate, ARNOLD & PORTER 
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/10/hurdles-ahead-for-cas-fe-
male-director-mandate.  
34  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e)(1) (West 2018). 
35  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e)(1)(A) (West 2018).  
36  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2018).  The relevant portion of text of California Senate Bill No. 
826:  
(c) No later than July 1, 2019, the Secretary of State shall have published a report on its Internet Web site 
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Thus, in order to formulate this report, corporations must inform the Secretary of 
State of their submission to the bill or else face an additional $100,000 fine.  
The law makes no mention of a corporation’s place of incorporation, only the 
location of “principal executive offices.”37  There is a question, though, as to whether 
the mandate is applicable to companies incorporated elsewhere.  Corporate case law 
has established a rule that “in disputes involving a corporation and its relationships 
with shareholders, officers or agents, the law to be applied is the law of the state of 
incorporation,” commonly known as the internal-affairs doctrine.38  Critics of the law 
suggest the conflict with this doctrine will be the Achilles heel of the legislation.  
Moreover, if the legislation were enforced only against corporations incorporated 
within California, that would significantly reduce the number of corporations 
affected.  Notably, 80% of the Russell 3000 Index companies housed in California 
are incorporated in Delaware.39   
Supporters of the law point to § 2115.5 and argue by analogy that the mandate 
applies to publicly held corporations incorporated outside California.  Section 2115.5 
is an addition to the state Corporations Code that attempts to make all components of 
§ 301.3 also applicable to foreign corporations.40  Section 2115.5(a) states that the 
bill “shall apply … to the exclusion of law of the jurisdiction in which the foreign 
corporation is incorporated.”41  Thus, the provision seeks to preempt the law of the 
place of incorporation also for any “foreign corporation with outstanding shares listed 
on a major United States stock exchange.”42  The parallel to treatment of foreign 
corporations is not especially strong.43  This interpretation may be an overreach of 
                                                          
documenting the number of domestic and foreign corporations whose principal executive offices, ac-
cording to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in California and who have at least one female 
director.  
 
(d) No later than March 1, 2020, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall publish a report on 
its Internet Web site regarding, at a minimum, all of the following:  
 
(1) The number of corporations subject to this section that were incompliance with the requirements 
of this section during at least one point during the preceding calendar year.  
(2) The number of publicly held corporations that moved their United States headquarters to Cali-
fornia from another state or out of California into another state during the preceding calendar year.  
(3) The number of publicly held corporations that were subject to this section during the preceding 
year, but are no longer publicly traded.  
S. 826, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018).  
37  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018). 
38  Internal-Affairs Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
39  See Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Bill Requiring California Corporate Boards to Include 
Women, L. A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2018 4:00 PM) http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-governor-women-
corporate-boards-20180930-story.html. 
40  CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.5(a) (West 2018). 
41  CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.5(a) (West 2018). 
42  CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.5(b) (West 2018).  
43  See Keith Paul Bishop, Why California’s Gender Quota Bill is More Likely to be Unconstitutional 
Than California’s Pseudo- Foreign Corporations Act, NAT’L. L. REV. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.natlawre-
view.com/article/why-california-s-gender-quota-bill-more-likely-to-be-unconstitutional-california-s (discuss-
ing the California Corporations Code § 2115.5 and how the Delaware Supreme Court has refused to give it 
effect). 
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the California state government, which will be discussed more thoroughly later in 
this Note.   
However, even if the mandate were to be stringently enforced, making SB-826 
applicable only to corporations both headquartered and incorporated in California, 
the impact would still be significant.  Nearly 100 companies would still be affected 
if SB-826 goes into enforcement under that interpretation.  The resulting impact 
would be that 684 women will have to be hired by the year 2021 to corporate boards 
in order to comply with the new law.44  This would still create enormous opportunity 
for women and be a step towards ending the gender disparity in greater haste than 
would come about naturally.  
 SB-826 requires all publicly traded corporations whose principal executive 
offices are in California and have outstanding shares on a major United States stock 
exchange to have at least one female on their board of directors by the year 2019.  
Then, depending on the size of the board, they must add an additional one to two 
female directors by the year 2021.  Accompanying these appointments, the 
corporation must timely file annual board information updates with the Secretary of 
State.  If the disclosures are not complied with or the quotas of female directors not 
met, the corporation could face fines totaling $300,000 or more.  
 
B.THE PURPOSE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 826 
 
  Effective legislation is not only about the requirements, but how effectively 
those means effectuate the ends or the purpose of the law.  This involves looking at 
the motivation and legislative intent behind SB-826.  Here, we can look to the 
commentary of its author and the wording of the bill itself to decipher the mandate’s 
purpose.  Senator Hannah Beth-Jackson was the author of SRC-62 in 2013, urging 
an increase in the number of women on corporate boards of directors toward the same 
quotas currently required by SB-826.45  Senator Beth-Jackson found that by 
December 31, 2016, less than 20% of the Russell 3000 Index companies covered had 
appointed the minimum number of female directors proposed by the resolution within 
the three-year cut-off period.46  Thus, in 2017, Senator Jackson authored the current 
bill in the interest of creating a binding quota.  Her motivation stems from the fact 
that “[o]ne-fourth of California’s publicly traded companies still do not have a single 
woman on their board.”47  Though liberal-leaning, California lags behind the national 
average of 16.2%, for the Russell 3000 Index of women serving as female directors 
in public corporations, with only 15.5% of corporate board seats held by women.48  
                                                          
44  McGreevy, supra note 39 (“If the law survives legal challenge, 684 women will need to fill board 
seats for Russell 3000 companies by 2021.”). 
45  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018); S.C.R. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (CA 2013) (“[W]ithin a 
three year-period from January 2014 to December 2016, inclusive, every publicly held corporation in California 
with nine or more directors seats have a minimum of three women on its board, … with five to eight director 
seats have a minimum of two women on its board, and … with fewer than five director seats have a minimum 
of one woman on its board.”).   
46  CAL. SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS, supra note 21.  
47  Id.  
48  See Johnson, supra note 33.  
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Senator Beth-Jackson has also been quoted saying, “With women comprising over 
half the population and making over 70% of purchasing decisions, their insight is 
critical to discussions and decisions that affect corporate culture, actions and 
profitability.”49  Senator Beth-Jackson advocates that the addition of more female 
directors is not only equitable, but also enhances the “performance, governance, 
innovation, and opportunity” of the corporation.50  
Turning to the wording of the bill itself, SB-826 cites multiple statistics that have 
found corporate boards with three or more female directors more profitable.51  Such 
corporations are more likely to have higher reported earnings,52 higher average return 
on equity,53 and better stock performance.54  Other benefits among boards with 
women directors are that they tend to be more sustainable and future-oriented.55  
There are two issues with this research.  The first is that the majority of the statistics 
about corporate performance used in the bill have been taken from two primary 
studies: one done by MSCI Inc., a global provider of equity, stock market index, and 
portfolio analysis tools; the other a long-term study by Credit Suisse Group AG, a 
joint-stock company that owns Credit Suisse Bank.  The MSCI study purports that 
corporations, which reach a “critical mass” of women, also referred to as the “tipping 
point,” had a median change in their earning per share of 37% and a ten percentage 
point change on their return on equity.56  The study is limited, though, by the fact 
they cannot prove a causal link between the addition of women and rise in economic 
prosperity, only a correlation.57  The study in effect minimizes their research by 
stating “[a]cademic studies have tied diversity in various groups to higher levels of 
                                                          
49  CAL. SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS, supra note 21. 
50  Id. 
51  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“According to 
the study entitled ‘Women Directors on Corporate Boards From Tokenism to Critical Mass,’ by M. Torchia, A. 
Calabro, and M. Huse, published in the Journal of Business Ethics in 2011, and report entitled ‘Critical Mass 
on Corporate Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance,’ attaining critical mass … creates an 
environment where women are no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content and process of 
board discussions.”).  
52  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3.  See also editor and reviser’s notes for § 301.3, which state: “[a] 2017 study 
by MSCI found that United States companies that began the five-year period from 2011 to 2016 with three or 
more female directors reported earnings per share that were 45 percent higher than those companies with no 
female directors at the beginning of the period.”  
53  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(2) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“In 2014, Credit 
Suisse found that companies with at least one woman on their board had an average return on equity (ROE) of 
12.2 percent, compares to 10.1 percent in companies with no female directors.”).  
54  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(4) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“Credit Suisse 
conducted a six-year global research study from 2006 to 2012, with more than 2,000 companies worldwide, 
showing that women on boards improve business performance for key metrics, including stock performance.”).  
55  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(3) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“A 2012 University 
of California, Berkley study called ‘Women Create a Sustainable Future’ found that companies with more 
women on their boards are more likely to ‘create a sustainable future’ by … instituting strong governance struc-
tures with high level of transparency.”).  
56  Meggin Thwing Eastman et al., The Tipping Point: Women on Boards and Financial Performance, p. 
15, MSCI ESG RESEARCH (Dec. 2016), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/fd1f8228-cc07-4789-acee-
3f9ed97ee8bb.  
57  Id.  
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creativity and better decision making.”58  Thus, a corporate board with more 
diversity, not necessarily isolated to gender diversity, will have greater overall 
success.  Second, the Credit Suisse six-year study is a global study monitoring 
countries like France, Spain, Belgium, and Germany where quotas have already been 
introduced.59  The resulting research affirms that diversity delivers greater innovation 
and corporate performance.60  However, in the countries that have already mandated 
quotas such as Spain, for example, they are not anticipated to be in full compliance 
with the quota by the required year.61  There the quota is having minimal success.  
Further, one of the greatest obstacles the study cites for overcoming gender diversity 
is cultural bias—a difficult variable to measure across countries.62  Though the results 
of the study are limited, it is the longest existing study examining gender diversity 
and corporate performance.  Finally, regardless of the study’s defects, nearly all of 
the statistical evidence for the bill supports the addition of women on behalf of 
corporate performance, a purely economic standpoint.   
This further begs the question: is the profitability of corporations a proper 
purpose of state legislation?  Was SB-826 driven by a lack of corporate performance?  
Rather, it is important to look at the historical context from which SB-826 sprung 
from.  In October of 2017, Ashley Judd became the first celebrity to go on record 
exposing the “open secret” that was the repeated years of sexual abuse committed by 
Harvey Weinstein, filmmaker and cofounder of Miramax records, toward Hollywood 
actresses.63  No one knew this single interview would result in a deluge of 
accusations, exposing sexual misconduct among beloved comedians, famous chefs 
and even Supreme Court appointees.64  Sexual misconduct scandals were uncovered 
in all industries.  Two of the primary industries affected were the entertainment 
industry and the tech industry,65 both of which have strong roots in California and 
would be regulated by SB-826.  The resulting conclusion is that there is a relationship 
between the gender gap and sexual harassment.”66  A male-dominated workforce may 
                                                          
58  Id.  
59  See generally Barbara Lejczavk, Diversity on Board!, CREDIT SUISSE GRP. AG (Oct. 6, 2015),  
https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/articles/news-and-expertise/diveristy-on-board-201506.html. 
60  Id.  “As the report concludes: ‘It is not case of a greater ability of one gender versus the other but that 
a more diverse group makes for better decision making and corporate performance.’” Id.  
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  See Zacharek, et al., supra note 5. 
64  See Charles Jones, #MeToo One Year Later: Cosby, Moonves fall, Sex Harassment Fight at Work Far 
from Over, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2018 5:21 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/04/me-
too-workplace-sexual-harassment-laws-policies-progress/1378191002/.  The article discusses the conviction of 
comedian Bill Cosby on sex offense charges, the resignation of Chef Mario Batali who stepped down from his 
company after accusations of him groping multiple women, and the accusations of sexual harassment made 
against, now Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh.  
65  See generally Jena McGregor, Uber, Google and the Long, Lingering Tail of #MeToo, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/26/uber-google-long-lingering-tail-me-
too/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1bdf92e0f9a2.  
66  See Vanessa Fuhrmans, What #MeToo Has to Do with the Workplace Gender Gap, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
23, 2018 4:16 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-metoo-has-to-do-with-the-workplace-gender-gap-
1540267680. (“[M]anagement experts and executives say, harassment can be a direct side effect of a workplace 
that slights women on everything from pay to promotions, especially when the perception is that men run the 
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give the perception that women’s voices are unwelcome and that men are in charge.67  
A by-product of this type of culture can also be an increase in sexual harassment and 
workplace slights such as unequal pay and opportunities for women.  Therefore, 
putting more women on corporate boards provides a protective barrier against 
workplace oppression and promotes a more inclusive, safer environment.  
In light of public history, it is unlikely that SB-826 was driven by corporate 
profitability.  Thus, the goals of the bill are to create an equal gender balance for top 
corporate executives, improve diversity, and decrease workplace harassment.  It has 
been driven out of a concern for equal rights and protections.  Besides corporate 
performance, there are two clear reasons behind SB-826.  First, without an initiative 
like this to expedite the process, the United States Government Accountability Office 
and similar studies estimate it will take forty years for the number of women on 
corporate boards to match the number of men.68  In effect, SB-826 will cut the 
projected natural timeline to a fraction of the period, requiring all boards to be in 
compliance within the next two years.69  Second, the Act uses the language of 
attaining a “critical mass” of women on boards.70  The purpose of this law is to 
transform the culture of boardrooms so that women no longer feel tokenized.71  
Developing a critical mass is also essential to women having enough presence and 
influence that they have the ability to effectuate real change.72  SB-826 was proposed 
for the purpose of making corporate boards a representative reflection of women in 
the general population in a reasonable time period.  This notion is also supported by 
statistical evidence that boards with women on them are more successful in their 
overall productivity and governance.73  The inclusive nature of such boards would 
likely have an effect on decreasing the amount of workplace harassment and 
increasing accountability among executives.  The side effect is that this will also 
increase profitability of corporations, but is that really such a terrible side effect?  
Senator Jackson said it best, “[i]t’s not only the right thing to do, it’s good for a 
company’s bottom line.”74 
 
 
                                                          
show and women can’t speak up.”).  
67  Id. 
68  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(f) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3. 
69  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018). 
70  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3. 
71  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“According to 
the study entitled ‘Women Directors on Corporate Boards From Tokenism to Critical Mass,’ by M. Torchia, A. 
Calabro, and M. Huse, published in the Journal of Business Ethics in 2011, and report entitled ‘Critical Mass 
on Corporate Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance,’ attaining critical mass … creates an 
environment where women are no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content and process of 
board discussions.”). 
72  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(B) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“Boards of 
directors need to have at least three women to enable them to interact and exercise an influence on the working 
style, processes, and tasks of the board, in turn positively affecting the level of organizational innovation within 
the firm they govern.”). 
73  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(c)(5)(A-D) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3. 
74  Antoinette Siu, California May Mandate a Woman in the Boardroom—But Businesses are Fighting 
It, CALMATTERS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://calmatters.org/articles/california-women-in-boardrooms-mandate/. 
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II.  THE POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES AGAINST SB-826 
 
 There is no doubt that the purpose behind SB-826 is well-intentioned.  However, 
from its inception the bill has been opposed by over thirty business groups 
challenging its legality.75  Then-Governor Jerry Brown admitted to the weakness of 
the bill in his letter to the Senate.76  He was quoted as saying, “I don’t minimize the 
potential flaws that indeed may prove fatal to its ultimate implementation.  
Nevertheless, recent events in Washington, D.C.—and beyond—make it crystal clear 
that many are not getting the message.”77  Regardless of the need for the law, the 
question is whether the requirements as written could survive legal challenge.  This 
Part will discuss the likely grounds on which a lawsuit would be brought against SB-
826.  The three most obvious attacks to be made on this bill are: (1) SB-826 is 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of California as it allows employment decisions to 
be based solely on one classification of diversity; (2) SB-826 violates of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (3) SB-826 is unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to corporations and is a case of 
government overreach.   
  
A. SB-826 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF U.S. AND CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS 
 
 The first potential lawsuit SB-826 could face is violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees: “No 
State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”78  The Amendment is a personal right certain to each individual.  Inversely, 
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one person and something 
else when applied to another person of the same or different classification.79  As 
Justice Powell wrote, “[i]f both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not 
equal.”80  The jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment has afforded that unequal 
treatment of a person based on their membership in a protected group falls within the 
scope of this amendment.81  Therefore, quotas based on a select classification have 
been found unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as they result in 
adverse treatment of the excluded group.82  However, one exception to this has been 
the proposition of affirmative action—the allowance of the consideration of race in 
                                                          
75  McGreevy, supra note 39.  
76  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Governor’s signing message editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3.  
77  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(g)(1)(A) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3. 
78  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1. 
79  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion).   
80  Id. 
81  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 227 (1995).  
82  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 224 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
  
 Journal of Legislation 335 
 
decision making because diversity is a compelling interest of the United States.83  
Affirmative action is often associated with university admissions.  The wealth of 
precedent written is regarding cases about the category of race and whether that can 
be considered during the application process.84  SB-826 does not fall directly within 
this case law.  Nonetheless, the use of a quota easily triggers the discussion of 
affirmative action and could be used as the tangential rationale for why SB-826 
should be struck down.  
Determining what is a constitutional affirmative action plan and what is a quota 
under the guise of an affirmative action has not been easy.  In the landmark case on 
this issue, Regents University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court found the 
special admissions program of the Medical School at the University of California at 
Davis illegal but upheld that race may be a factor considered in selection of applicants 
for admission.85  Petitioner was a white male who was rejected from the state’s 
medical school.86  He then challenged the legality of the school’s special admissions 
program, which reserved sixteen of the 100 positions in the program for 
“disadvantaged” minority students.87  In Justice Powell’s plurality opinion, he 
applied the levels of scrutiny test that originated in United States v. Carolene 
Products.88  Justice Powell asserted for the first time that race and ethnic distinctions 
are inherently suspect.  Thus, should be subject to the most exacting judicial 
examination—strict scrutiny.89  Practices evaluated under strict scrutiny are only 
justified where they further the compelling interest of the government and are 
necessary to safeguarding that interest, meaning there is no less restrictive alternative 
available.90  In Bakke, the use of a quota system failed strict scrutiny because the type 
of diversity considered a “state interest encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single 
though important element.”91  Genuine diversity would not benefit from a quota 
system since it is not a sustainable solution.  Further, the type of fixed percentage 
quota system implemented at U.C. Davis was not a necessary means toward the end 
of achieving educational diversity.92   
In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld a race-conscious admissions program for the 
University of Michigan Law School in Grutter v. Bollinger, finding that it was 
                                                          
83  See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
84  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 224 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013), aff’d, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016); Students 
for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d, 807 F.3d 
472 (1st Cir. 2015). 
85  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 
86  Id. 
87  Id.  
88  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 
25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1992) (citing United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938)).  
89  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.  
90  Id. at 305.  
91  Id. at 315.  
92  Id. at 316.  
 336 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:14] 
 
narrowly tailored.93  Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to do away with any discrimination based 
on race.94  Though diversity is a compelling interest, the use of racial classifications 
is dangerous and should be “employed no more broadly than the interest demands.”95  
The Court’s holding reflects that admissions processes like Grutter using a wide 
variety of considerations will continue to pass the strict scrutiny standard.96  To be 
considered narrowly tailored, the race-conscious admissions program cannot unduly 
burden persons not in the categorization; race must be limited to a “plus” factor.97  A 
narrowly tailored affirmative action program does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Moreover, the program in Grutter was not based on a fixed quota but 
on enrolling a “critical mass” of minority students.98  The concept speaks to the 
“substantial, important and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to 
produce, including cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial 
stereotypes.”99  Conversely, Justice O’Connor also wrote that “to assure some 
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin 
would be patently unconstitutional.”100  Thus, a quota would cross the line.  
The aforementioned cases discussed race-conscious affirmative action programs, 
not gender based programs.  In Bakke, the Court did shed some light on how a gender-
based cases would be treated.  It determined gender would be handled with a lower 
level of scrutiny—intermediate scrutiny.101  The rationale of the Court was that 
“[g]ender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and practical 
problems present in preferential programs premised on racial and ethnic criteria.”102  
The Court reasoned there are only two possible classifications for gender making 
class wide questions as to whether a group is being unduly burdened much more 
manageable to a reviewing court.103  “Precedent shows, however, that facial quotas 
would still not survive even in intermediate scrutiny, the lesser scrutiny applied to 
sex-based affirmative action programs.”104  
Applying these principals to SB-826, similar to Bakke, where the admission 
                                                          
93  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
94  Id. at 341–42. 
95  Id. at 342. 
96  Id. at 306 (finding University of Michigan Law School based their admissions decisions off “students’ 
academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment of their talents, experiences, and potential . . . including a 
personal statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to the Law 
School life and diversity” as well as GPA and LSAT scores.  The university also looks at ‘soft variables,’ such 
as recommenders’ enthusiasm, the quality of undergraduate institution and … difficulty of undergraduate course 
selection”). 
97  Id. at 341. 
98  Id. at 308. 
99  Id.  
100  Id.  
101  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302. 
102  Id. at 302–03. 
103  Id. at 303. 
104  See Julia Glen, Note, Affirmative Action: The Constitutional Approach to Ending Sex Disparities on 
Corporate Boards, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2089, 2110 (2017).  Glen cites Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 485 
U.S. 718 (1982) for the proposition that a state supposed school could categorically prohibit men from being in 
attendance.  Id.  
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program set aside sixteen seats strictly for minority applicants, SB-826 sets a rigid 
allocation of board seats that must be occupied by women by the year 2021.  The law 
does use the term minimum, giving some flexibility as to the number of women who 
would be sitting on the board or the possibility of expanding the number of board 
seats to allow for the addition of more women.  It could be argued that because of 
these two omissions it is not a facial quota.  However, the motivation behind the 
legislation is for corporate boards to reflect women’s actual representation in the 
community—40%.  In light of this notion, it appears SB-826 is fated for an 
unavoidable demise as an unconstitutional quota.  The representation mandated by 
SB-826 would not survive even intermediate scrutiny.  This type of rigid percentage 
is exactly what Justice O’Connor warned against.  
But the nature of corporate boards is inherently different from that of universities.  
Board directors are elected at the annual meeting of shareholders.105  One of the few 
voting rights given to shareholders is their ability to elect directors.  Under Delaware 
General Corporation Law, shareholders must comply with particular voting rules 
such as acting as a group by holding a meeting with adequate notice and quorum in 
order to elect directors.106  A large corporation could have hundreds of shareholders 
and a true majority is required, meaning a majority of all possible shares, in order to 
elect a director.  This process varies drastically from a “personal ratings” based 
approach that considers a select few traits used by selection committees of 
Universities.107  That type of system results in relatively arbitrary scoring for 
candidates.108  Therefore, comparing the election of corporate directors to the 
selection of students by universities is factually like comparing apples to oranges.  
The only slim hope that SB-826 would survive is that the case law is too far-fetched 
to be applicable.  
A final consideration is that even affirmative action may no longer be considered 
constitutional in a matter of years.  Though the reasoning of Bakke was affirmed in 
the Fisher I and II cases in 2013 and just recently in 2016,109 the forthcoming case 
brought against Harvard College could upset a decades long precedent.110  Since 
Fisher, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed dramatically with the 
addition of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.111  The absence of swing-vote Justice 
                                                          
105  HAROLD MARSH, R. ROY FINKLE & KEITH PAUL BISHOP, MARSH’S CALIFORNIA CORPORATE LAW 
§10.05 (2019).  
106  8 DEL. CODE § 141(b) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04. 
107  See Anemona Hartocollis, Does Harvard Admissions Discriminate? The Lawsuit on Affirmative Ac-
tion, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/harvard-affirmative-ac-
tion-asian-americans.html. 
108  Id. 
109  Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
110  Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 
2015), aff’d, 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (refusing to intervene in Harvard’s admissions procedures and finding 
that there is not a statistically significant block placed against Asian applicants to the university).  
111  See Adam Liptak, How Brett Kavanaugh Would Transform the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/us/politics/judge-kavanaugh-supreme-court-justices.html (“His 
[Kavanaugh] confirmation would result in a rare replacement of the court’s swing vote justice, moving Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts Jr.—a much more reliably conservative vote than Justice Kennedy—to the court’s ide-
ological center.”)  
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Kennedy as well could mean the end of favorable affirmative action decisions.112  
Some would argue this is long overdue stating, “[a]ffirmative action has become the 
gateway drug to identity politics, or the breakup of America into antagonistic 
‘oppressor’ and ‘subordinate’ groups constantly engaging in power relations.”113  
Thus, even if the current legislation could surpass the test of scrutiny and evade 
designation as a quota that may not be enough.   
In conclusion, SB-826 does not fit within the usual fact patterns of affirmative 
action cases. The precedent cases would have to be greatly stretched to accommodate 
the unique modes of election of corporate boards that differ substantially from the 
application processes used in university admissions.  Inversely, the abundance of 
affirmative action case law sets a bright-line rule that quotas are unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protections Clause.  The final factor that tips the scales in favor of 
SB-826 being overruled on constitutional grounds is that if it were to be brought to 
the Supreme Court, the Court’s growing sentiments against any type of affirmative 
action measure would likely dominate.  
 
B. SB-826 VIOLATES TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
 
The second potential lawsuit on which SB-826 could face a legal challenge is a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Title VII of the United States 
Code prohibits discrimination in employment practices on the basis of race, color, 
sex, religion, or national origin.114  It mandates that unlawful employment practices 
shall include: “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, privileges of employment” because of an 
individual membership in a protected category.115  Title VII was “aimed primarily at 
eradicating employment discrimination based on race,” but by the time it was passed 
by Congress it had been expanded to include other underrepresented groups, 
including sex.116  Sex is construed more broadly than just male or female assignment 
at birth.117  Title VII provides “affirmative action” as a remedy118 that could take the 
form of reinstatement, back pay, or any such relief the court deems just and proper.119  
Though “affirmative action” has no special meaning, there are limitations to the 
                                                          
112  See generally Ariana de Vogue, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Evolution on Affirmative Action, CNN 
(June 23, 2016, 2:21 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/politics/supreme-court-anthony-kennedy-affirma-
tive-action/index.html; see also Yuvraj Joshi, Bakke to the Future: Affirmative Action After Fisher, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2016). 
113  See Mike Gonzalez, Yes, it’s Time for Affirmative Action to End—Finally, FOX NEWS (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/yes-its-time-for-affirmative-action-to-end-finally. 
114  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-391 (with a gap of Pub. L. No. 115-
334)). 
115  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-391 (with a gap of Pub. L. No. 115-
334)).  
116  Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 611 (1998). 
117  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that Title VII barred discrimination 
based on sex, for failing to act in a way that conforms to social ideals; Sex stereotyping is part of sex discrimi-
nation). 
118  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5).  
119  West, supra note 116. 
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methods that can be used to promote minority employment in the workplace.120  
Among these constraints, Title VII indicates that an employer cannot “limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” based on the protected 
categories.121  In essence, Title VII advises against preferential treatment or any rigid 
percentages used to favor minority workers.122  Therefore, Title VII effectively 
prohibits the use of quotas. 
Just one year after Bakke was decided, the Supreme Court was again faced with 
a quota question but this time under the Civil Rights Act.  In United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, the Supreme Court upheld a one-for-one quota for minority 
workers admitted to a training program.123  Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, 
held that Congress intended Title VII to be a “catalyst to cause employers and unions 
to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and … cannot be 
interpreted as an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious 
affirmative action efforts…”124  United Steelworkers can be distinguished from 
Bakke as it was an affirmative action plan proposed as part of a collective-bargaining 
agreement.125  By its terms, the training program selected trainees based on seniority 
with “the proviso that at least 50% of the trainees were to be black until the percentage 
of the black skilled craftworkers approximated the percentage of blacks in the local 
labor force.”126  The conclusion was that the proposed plan fell on the permissible 
side of affirmative action as it aligned with the purpose and intent of Title VII.127  As 
Justice Brennan keenly pointed out, “the plan is a temporary measure, not intended 
to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.”128  
United Steel Workers is just one in a string of cases that have muddied the stance on 
the legality of quotas.  It was not until 2009 that a definitive answer was given.  
In Ricci v. Destefano, the Supreme Court clearly stated that employment law 
rarely permits quotas.129  This case, like the previous cases, was also in the context 
                                                          
120  Id.  
121  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-391 (with a gap of Pub. L. No. 115-
334)).  
122  42 U.SC.A. § 2000e-2(j) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-426).  The relevant portion of Title VII 
states:  
Nothing contained in this [subchapter] shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, 
labor organization, or joint labor management committee . . . to grant preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or to any group because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group 
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons. . . 
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin in any community, State, section or other area . . .  
Id.  
123  United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). 
124  Id. at 204 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)) (quotations omitted). 
125  Id. at 193. 
126  Id. at 199.  
127  Id. at 195. 
128  Id. at 208. 
129  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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of racial discrimination.  In Ricci, a group of white firefighters and one Hispanic 
firefighter sued the City of New Haven because, though they passed examination, 
they were denied the chance at promotion as the City refused to certify the results of 
the exam.130  The results showed that white candidates had outperformed minority 
candidates.  After inciting protest, the City decided to throw out the examinations to 
avoid a lawsuit based on the statistical disparity.131  Nevertheless, this discrimination 
lawsuit still ensued by the converse parties.  The City explained that it was caught in 
a catch-22: if it certified the test results they would face liability under Title VII for 
adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on minority firefighters.  Writing for 
a 5–4 majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “[w]ithout some other justification, 
this express, race-based decision-making violates Title VII’s command that 
employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s 
race.”132  He acknowledged that no matter how well intentioned the actions were, the 
employment decision was based on the member’s status in a protected category—
bluntly, that too many whites and not enough minorities passed the test.133  Justice 
Kennedy reasoned that allowing this disparate treatment based on a good faith fear 
of committing disparate treatment could turn into an unwarranted focus on 
statistics134 and, worst of all, a quota system.135  Justice Kennedy feared a quota 
system based subjectively on employer ideals, but the opinion clearly expressed its 
distaste for quotas.   
To further complicate the issue, the plaintiffs in Ricci v. Destefano also 
brought a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.136  It 
was determined that the discarding of the tests was a violation of Title VII, so the 
Court never reached the issue of equal protection.137  The Court did briefly recognize 
the tension between “elimination segregation” that allows affirmative action as a 
“remedial program” under the Equal Protection Clause and disparate treatment under 
Title VII.138  Justice Scalia was the only one to directly address the issue in his 
concurrence.  He wisely wrote, “the war between disparate impact and equal 
protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about 
how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”139  Even if SB-826 were 
able to survive a claim brought on grounds of equal protection that is not to say it 
would be found legal under Title VII.  The bill is demanding that corporate board 
decisions be made based on membership in a protected category.  There are numerous 
scenarios that could be conceived where a man would face disparate treatment in 
                                                          
130  Id. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 579.  
133  Id.  
134  Id. at 581. 
135  Id. at 582 (“[e]ven worse, an employer could discard test results (or other employment practices) 
with the intent of obtaining the employers preferred racial balance”). 
136  Id. at 576. 
137  Id. at 563. 
138  Id. at 582–83. 
139  Id. at 595–96; see also Abigail Thernstrom, The Supreme Court Says No to Quotas, WALL ST. J. 
(July 1, 2009 12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124640586803076705. 
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attempting to meet the mandated number of female board directors.  Additionally, 
gender is only one categorization in creating true diversity.  
Moreover, there is no description of how applicants will be evaluated under 
SB-826 or what other qualifications would be in consideration.  It could be argued 
that this law falls within the parameters of United Steel Workers.140  Currently, only 
15.5% of corporate board seats are held by women and one-fourth of California’s 
public companies in the Russell 3000 index have no women serving as directors, yet 
women represent half of the population.141  Under United Steel Workers, it could be 
considered a “manifest […]  imbalance” if the number of qualified women on 
corporate boards is so strikingly unjust in comparison to the actual population.142  
However, this law is not a self-imposed affirmative action plan of a private company; 
SB-826 is a government-imposed requirement.  Being a woman is the dispositive 
factor in this gender-conscious law.  There is also no mention that this law is 
temporary like the one at issue in United Steel Workers.  Instead, SB-826 is more 
closely aligned with Ricci, where the actions were well intentioned but still resulted 
in an act of disparate treatment.  There are possible scenarios where the consequences 
of this law would prevent men from being hired, causing preferential treatment to 
persons not in the classified category solely based on their membership.  This type of 
preferential treatment was held to be facially unconstitutional.143  
Critically, the most important question not yet discussed is whether there is 
coverage.  Can corporate board directors even be held liable under Title VII?  SB-
826 defines “employee” broadly as any individual employed by an employer, not 
including those elected to public office.144  The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission gave greater insight through its compliance manual, which particularly 
focused on how members of a board of directors and major shareholders should be 
treated.145  Generally, partners, officers, members of boards of directors, or major 
shareholders will not qualify as employees.146  But the determination should not be 
made solely based on title.  It is a consideration of whether the “individual acts 
independently and participates in managing the organization, or whether the 
individual is subject to another’s control.”147  Under Delaware law, the primary 
influence of corporate law, directors are given complete control of the business and 
                                                          
140  United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
141  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(e) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3. 
142  United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). 
143  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). 
144  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-426). 
145  U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUEL SECTION 2: THRESHOLD 
ISSUES (2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1-d. 
146  Id. 
147  Id.  The relevant portion of the manual states: “Factors to be considered with regard to coverage of 
partners, officers, members of boards of directors, and major shareholders:  
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individuals 
work;  
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual’s work;  
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization;  
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or 
contracts; 
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses and liabilities of the organization.”  
Id. 
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affairs of the corporation.148  This includes hiring officers and determining their roles.  
This type of sweeping control—that is only answerable to shareholders who can 
choose to not re-elect a director—is unlikely to fall under the definition of an 
employee.  Ultimately, even if SB-826 factually fits within a Title VII claim, which 
has been previously discussed, it would not be able to be struck down on these 
grounds because there is not proper coverage under the statute.  
 
C. SB-826 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO CORPORATIONS CHARTERED 
OUTSIDE OF CALIFORNIA 
D.  
The third potential challenge SB-826 could face is that it is unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause of the United States when it is applied to corporations 
not headquartered within California.  SB-826 is potentially a violation because it 
purports to apply to corporations with their principal executive offices in California 
that are chartered outside of California.  Article I of the Constitution gives Congress 
the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”149  The Clause has been held to limit the ability 
of states to tax or regulate activities that will affect interstate commerce.150  SB-826 
is being applied equally to corporations chartered in California and those out-of-state, 
as its enforcement hinges on the location of a corporation’s “principal executive 
offices.”151  The Court has also struck down state laws that are not discriminatory but 
unduly burden interstate commerce.152  In Pike v. Bruce, the Court affirmed that laws 
that create conflicting regulatory requirements, and even those that do not, will be 
struck down if they put a burden on interstate commerce and there is not a compelling 
interest.153  SB-826 creates a conflicting regulation between what is required of 
corporate boards by laws of the state of incorporation compared to what is being 
mandated by California law.  Therefore, SB-826 is putting a burden on interstate 
commerce where its benefits do not outweigh the burdens its placing.  For California, 
it is unclear what the motivation would be for controlling the makeup of corporate 
boards outside of the state.154  The compelling-state-interest test is the same test used 
to determine whether a law can survive strict scrutiny in an Equal Protection 
analysis.155   
SB-826 advocates that the mandate is in the interest of increased corporate 
performance that comes with gender balanced corporate boards.  However, corporate 
                                                          
148  8 DEL. C. § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chap-
ter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”).  
149  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 32.  
150  See Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 806, 808 n.9. (1971). 
151  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2018). 
152  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
153  Id.   
154  Vikram David Amar & Jason Mazzone, Part Three on California’s Mandate that Women be Placed 
on Corporate Boards: Dormant Commerce Clause and Improper Government Purpose Questions, VERDICT 
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/11/01/part-three-on-californias-mandate-that-women-be-
placed-on-corporate-boards. 
155  Compelling-State-Interest Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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performance or profitability is a matter of the “business and affairs of every 
corporation.”156  Delaware law sets out by statute the requirements necessary for the 
size and composition of corporate boards.157  Any further constraints are to be 
included in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws.  Shareholders have the 
power to amend the by-laws.158  Directors who are responsible for managing the 
business and affairs of the corporation can make discretionary decisions as to what 
requirements are going to be held for the board.159  Further, as previously mentioned, 
the internal affairs doctrine states that the requirement of corporate boards is 
governed by the corporation’s state of incorporation and not by the state in which its 
principal executive offices are located.160  A board’s gender diversity is a matter of 
internal corporate governance, as is shareholder voting, and SB 826 interferes with 
both.  The law attempts to draw a parallel to the exception that has been made for 
foreign corporations under § 2115.5(a).  This argument is not compelling as § 2115.5 
includes, rather than specifically excludes, nationally traded corporations.161  
California also will have an extremely difficult case as to why it is a compelling 
interest of the State to be controlling the composition of other states’ corporate boards 
of directors.  In conclusion, a strong argument could be made under the Commerce 
Clause alongside a Fourteenth Amendment argument for why SB-826 is 
unconstitutional.  
 
III.  LEGAL ALTERNATIVES TO SB-826 
 
 The third Part of this Note will briefly discuss legal alternatives that could be 
used to achieve the same goal of greater representation of women on corporate 
boards.  If this bill is struck down, which it likely will be, California will have to 
determine different means to achieve this same end.  Alternative approaches to 
narrowing the gender gap on corporate boards include: (1) a tax incentive plan to 
induce corporations to voluntarily end the sex disparity in exchange for a tax break, 
(2) reforming SB-826 into a sunset provision encapsulated in another law so that it 
would expire in a short time period without re-approval, or (3) to allow the market to 
solve the issue.  
The first alternative is the most plausible and has already been implemented in 
the United Kingdom with success and argued for in other scholarship.162  A voluntary 
program would help to “avoid any confrontation with government regulation of the 
composition of executive boards.”163  A voluntary program would be more 
                                                          
156  8 DEL. CODE § 141(a) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04 (“The business and af-
fairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by and under the direction of a board 
of directors”).  
157  8 DEL. CODE § 141(b) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04.  
158  HAROLD MARSH JR., R. ROY FINKLE & KEITH PAUL BISHOP, MARSH’S CALIFORNIA CORPORATE 
LAW §5.17 (2019).  
159  8 DEL. CODE § 141(a) (2016), https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/. 
160  Internal-Affairs Doctrine, supra note 38. 
161  See generally Bishop, supra note 43. 
162  See Glen, supra note 104, at 2133.  
163  Id. at 2134.  
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comprehensive and also fall within the constitutional parameters set by affirmative 
action.  Such a program would have to be done on a company-by-company basis to 
decide the goal number of women directors for that corporation.164  Companies opting 
into this program would be required to do additional programming to facilitate the 
continued success.165  The hope is that this would create a pipeline to kick-start 
getting more women into executive positions going forward.  Since the program 
would not be permanent, it would be just a start to ending the gender gap.  If the 
corporations met the predetermined expectations of the program, they would also 
receive a tax benefit.166  For California, this could be a great compromise.  There are 
currently concerns about corporations evading taxes, but here would be an 
opportunity for a corporation to rightfully earn a tax break while still benefiting 
society at large.167  The problem with this program is that compliance would be 
voluntary.  There would be no mandated participation which would take an 
exceptional amount of time and resources to monitor if the program was on a 
personalized, company-by-company basis.  This alternative seems like it would have 
a high probability of success, since it aligns with corporate incentives.  
The second suggested alternative is to use a sunset provision.  Sunset provisions 
are “clauses embedded in legislation that allow a piece of legislation or a regulatory 
board to expire on a certain date.”168  The use of a sunset provision would reform SB-
826 to be more in line with prior approved, constitutional precedent of temporary 
measures of affirmative action.  The provision would be in place for a short time 
period, such as five years, until corporate boards are more representative of the 
general population.  It is not certain this would be an adequate amount of time to be 
impactful, or that this sort of provision would be as thorough as having an entire bill 
dedicated to the issue of underrepresentation.  But, it would be a start to resolving the 
disparity.  Sunset provisions have the added benefit of creating a burden-shifting 
paradigm.  Once the provision is set to expire, the burden lies on the proponents to 
gain political support to reenact the law.169  This helps to reduce status quo bias for 
fading political movements.170  The fact that the provision’s default is that it will 
expire helps to mitigate error and reduce costs associated with reenactment or an 
amendment.171  Governor Brown, in his introduction of the bill, admitted that he 
                                                          
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. at 2134–35. 
167  See e.g., Edmund DeMarche, California Democrats Want Businesses to Fork Over Half Tax-Cut 
Savings to State, FOX NEWS (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/california-democrats-want-
some-businesses-to-fork-over-half-tax-cut-savings-to-state (claiming two California lawmakers introduced a 
bill to make corporations return their tax benefits gained from loopholes and unconscionable tax breaks). 
168  BRIAN BAUGUS & FELER BOSE, MERCATUS CTR., SUNSET LEGISLATION IN THE STATE: BALANCING 
THE LEGISLATURE AND THE EXECUTIVE (2005), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Baugus-Sunset-Legis-
lation.pdf. 
169  See Ozan O. Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 102 CAL. L. REV. 409, 417 (2014).  
170  See id. at 438.  
171  Id. at 420 (“A temporary constitution or constitutional provision may mitigate both error and decision 
costs by increasing the quantity and quality of information available to the constitutional designers, reducing 
cognitive biases, promoting consensus building, and allowing the framers to employ temporary solution to tem-
porary social problems.”) (citations omitted).  
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worried for the constitutionality of the bill, and said it was meant to send a 
message.172  There are many other platforms to send a message than to enact a law 
that potentially tramples constitutional rights.173  Corporations are not the ones who 
should have to pay the litigation costs to attempt to overturn this bill.  Additionally, 
there is the added stigma of being the organization behind attacking a bill attempting 
to mandate gender equality in the workplace.  The social stigma of this, plus the added 
time, costs, and social criticism, could prevent organizations bringing suit, though 
they would have legitimate grounds.  
A final option would be to strike the law down entirely and allow time to take its 
course.  The bill does cite statistics that support the notion that as a society we are 
moving toward more equal representation of women.174  The increase in the 
“conscious consumer” means that corporations are succumbing to social concerns in 
order to increase their profits.175  Corporations are being held accountable by the 
general public to heighten their diversity efforts even without the added pressure of 
legislation.  We are moving toward equal representation of genders on corporate 
boards.  But without intervention, it would take forty to fifty years to accomplish the 
same goals that SB-826 could accomplish in two years.  Generally, corporations try 
to steer clear of greater state or federal government control and are willing to make 
voluntary improvements or amendments in order to avoid interference.176  Yet, 
skeptics of human nature suggest that “history teaches that such voluntary reforms 
are likely to be short-lived responses to passing pressures.”177  The issue is that SB-
826 is a well-intended piece of legislation, but it will not survive judicial challenge.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The gender imbalance in corporate boardrooms across the country is an issue.  
As previously discussed, it is statistically shocking how few women actually serve in 
those roles.178  SB-826 seeks to remedy a critical issue in this country in an expedited 
                                                          
172  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Governor’s signing message editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“I 
don’t minimize the potential flaws that indeed may prove fatal to its ultimate implementation.  Nevertheless, 
recent events in Washington, D.C.—and beyond—make it crystal clear that many are not getting the message.”).  
173  Amar & Mazzone, supra note 154. 
174  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(f)(2) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3. (“The 2017 Equilar 
Gender Diversity Index (GDI) revealed that it will take nearly 40 years for the Russell 3000 companies nation-
wide to reach gender parity—the year 2055.”).  
175  See Jessi Baker, The Rise of the Conscious Consumer: Why Businesses Need to Open Up, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/women-in-leadership/2015/apr/02/the-rise-of-the-conscious-con-
sumer-why-businesses-need-to-open-up, (arguing corporations answer to the American people and a trend of 
“conscious consumption” is on the rise); see generally Susan McPherson, 8 Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) Trends to Look for in 2018, FORBES (Jan. 12 , 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanmcpher-
son/2018/01/12/8-corporate-social-responsibility-csr-trends-to-look-for-in-2018/#cff37fa40ce5. 
176  Howard M. Metzenbaum, Legal Approaches to Corporate Governance, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
926, 930 (1981). 
177  Id.  
178  CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 Section 1(e)(1) editor’s and reviser’s notes for § 301.3 (“As of June 2017, 
among the 446 publicly traded companies included in the Russell 3000 index and headquartered in California, 
representing nearly $5 trillion in market capitalization, women directors held 566 seats, or 15.5 percent of seats, 
while men held 3,089 seats, or 84.5 percent of seats.”).  
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fashion.  The bill’s purpose and background are well-intentioned and rely upon 
insightful studies that show greater diversity increases financial gain, creativity, and 
a corporation’s overall sustainability.  This bill would help to make workplace 
environments safer and more successful.  However, there is no statistical evidence 
that greater gender balance is responsible for the increased prosperity of corporations.  
Nor can we ignore the means through which gender equality is being achieved. 
In sum, SB-826 is likely to face a host of constitutional challenges.  Its blatant 
use of a quota could not pass even a test of intermediate scrutiny.  The interests at 
stake here that benefit only one classification of persons do not rise to the level of a 
compelling state interest.  Further, the implementation of this law will create a 
conflict with laws of other states and countries.  California has little to no interest in 
dictating the qualification that out-of-state corporations should abide by in their 
composition of corporate boards.  This bill could be considered an overreach of 
California’s state government.  Additionally, it is not the corporation who should 
have to pay for this law to be struck down.  
What is the solution then?  California is likely going to have to go back to the 
drawing board and find a legal solution for this issue.  This Note only briefly touched 
on possible resolutions.  One that has growing potential is the use of voluntary tax 
benefit programs that encourage greater compliance.  Though this program may be 
costly, the alternative to doing nothing is to let this issue continue to resolve itself at 
a sluggish pace.  SB-826 is a hopeful piece of legislation, but it is not legal.  The next 
step is to create a more legitimate framework to carry out its well-intended purposes.  
In the end, this bill can be considered beneficial from the perspective of Governor 
Brown as it achieved his goal of getting politicians and other legislatures thinking 
about the problem of underrepresentation and, hopefully, inventing new solutions to 
tackle it.  
 
 
 
 
